People made a lot of moves on Tuesday, so I thought it might be good idea to do a bit of a recap.
We mainly talked about the 4D-ist's treatment of the statue/clay problem. Remember that in our original example, Lump began to exist years ago and will continue to exist for many more years. Angel was molded at noon and squished at 6 p.m.One of the theories we discussed was cohabitation theory, a form of 2-ism according to which Lump and Angel are distinct obects that share exactly the same matter and occupy exactly the same spatial region from noon until 6 pm. However, Lump and Angel's distinctness is attested to by their different historical (time of creation/destruction) and modal (e.g., squishability vs. non-squishability) properties. Those who think that modal properties are grounded in physics-y properties will be troubled by the apparent fact that Angel and Lump differ in their modal properties despite possessing exactly the same physics-y properties. They may have to accept the existence of brute modal properties. In addiiton, since statue and lump are not the only possible sortals that apply to our case -- but just the ones for which we have common English descriptors -- we may feel forced to accept gazillionism (not just 2-ism) where many many coincident objects co-exist from noon until 6 pm, distinguished only by their brute modal properties. Check out the very nice discussion of matters related to this stemming from the previous post by Damian.
The 4D-ist enters here to say that if we view Lump and Angel as 4D temporally extended objects then Angel and Lump are clearly distinct. Lump has Angel as a proper part. Angel and Lump share their temporal parts from Noon until 6 pm, but Lump has (and Angel does not) parts outside of the noon - 6 pm interval. Now that seems to account for the historical properties involved in the case we've discussed so far. However, suppose that Lump and Angel came into existence at noon and went out of existence at 6 pm -- via a Lumpl/Goliath scenario (See Wasserman for a description of Lumpl/Goliath) or via the spontaneous creation/destruction of matter. In this case, it seems that we would still want to say that Lump and Angel are distinct objects even though they share exactly the same 4D parts. Haven't we just raised the same problem for 4D-ism that had earlier been raised for Cohabitation theory. Must the 4D-ist accept brute modality to the extent that the 3D-ist does? Why or why not? Does the 4D-ist have tools in her toolbox that the 3D-ist doesn't?
Saturday, September 29, 2012
Wednesday, September 26, 2012
Tuesday, September 25, 2012
Modal Properties, Grounding, 2-ism
OK, this my attempt at clarifying the disagreement between Justin and me, as well as presenting the argument for my position:
2-ism (or one account of it, anyway) states that 2 objects can be distinct even if they share all the same parts and occupy the same space. For example, Lump and Angel share all the same parts and occupy the same space, yet they are two distinct objects. Furthermore, 2 objects can also be distinct even if they share the same historical properties, as long as they differ in other (e.g. modal) properties: Lumpl and Goliath are different objects even if they were both created and destroyed at the same time. For the sake of simplicity, I'll concern myself with the latter case (where all physical and historical properties are shared by the two objects), but this can probably be extended to the former case as well.
Grounding Problems:
The grounding worry is as follows:
(1) Physical properties fully ground all modal properties
(2) If (1), then objects that share all the same physical properties share the same modal properties.
(3) So, objects that share all the same physical properties share the same modal properties ((1), (2))
(4) If (3), then if Lumpl and Goliath share all the same physical properties, then Lumpl and Goliath share all the same modal properties.
(5) So, if Lumpl and Goliath share all the same physical properties, then Lumpl and Goliath share all the same modal properties ((3), (4))
(6) Lumpl and Goliath share all the same physical properties.
(7) So, Lumpl and Goliath share all the same modal properties ((5), (6))
(8) If Lumpl and Goliath share all the same modal properties, then the 2-ist explanation fails.
(9) So, the 2-ist explanation fails ((7), (8))
Quick defense of the premises:
(1) seems like a natural way of thinking of modal properties: the way an object is (physically) will determine the kinds of things the object can be/do.
(2) just expresses the thought that if a fully grounds b, then objects that are identical in terms of a will be identical in terms of b.
(4) is just an example of (2) in action.
(6) is just true by hypothesis. The reason I use Lumpl and Goliath instead of Lump and Angel is to prevent accusations that causal-historical properties count as part of the physical properties of an object: in this case, the causal-historical properties of the two objects are identical as well as all the other physical properties.
(8) is justified as follows: the 2-ist argues that Lumpl and Goliath are different objects because they have different modal properties. (8) just claims that if Lumpl and Goliath don't have different modal properties, then they are not different objects.
Justin's Move:
It seems like the most plausible premise to deny is (1), which is exactly what Justin did. Justin had an argument for his denial of (1), which goes as follows.
Define Fragility1 as: x is fragile iff it can be shattered by being hit.
Define Fragility2 as: x is fragile iff it can be destroyed by being hit.
(10) if physical properties fully ground all modal properties, then physical properties fully ground both Fragility1 and Fragility2.
(11) if physical properties fully ground Fragility2, then in a debate about whether objects can be destroyed by shattering the physical properties could act as evidence for one view over the other.
(12) It is not the case that in a debate about whether objects can be destroyed by shattering the physical properties could act as evidence for one view over the other.
(13) So, it is not the case that physical properties fully ground Fragility2. ((11), (12))
(14) So, it is not the case that physical properties fully ground modal properties ((10), (13))
I won't bother defending the premises, since that is not actually my concern (someone else is free to challenge them). Suppose we take the conclusion of the argument, and accept that (1) has been plausibly denied. We still have the grounding question: if physical properties don't fully ground modal properties, what does? We could just say that modal properties are brute, but Justin has another way out which might be a little better.
Justin proposed that what grounds the modal properties of something might be the type of thing it is. In other words, Lumpl is the type of thing lump, which includes the modal property of being able to survive squishing ('squishability'). Goliath is the type of thing statue which does not include the modal property of being able to survive squishing ('non-squishability'). Problem solved?
Another Grounding Problem:
Suppose that what grounds the modal property of non-squishability that Goliath has is the sortal property statue. What, then, grounds the sort statue? We can't say that it is physical properties, since Lumpl shares all its physical properties with Goliath. So if physical properties grounded the sort statue, then Lumpl would be a statue, and thus have all the same modal properties that Goliath has (which would in turn entail that the 2-ist is wrong by premise (8)). Maybe the way here would be to say that sortal properties like statue are brute. This is not to concede defeat to the original argument: maybe these sortal properties are less mysterious than modal properties. Whatever view we take, we had better not accept:
(15) Physical properties fully ground all sortal properties.
Even though the 2-ist is forced to reject (15), it seems strange to say that sortal properties such as statue are not grounded at all in physical properties. So the end result might look like:
(16) Sortal properties fully ground modal properties.
2-ism (or one account of it, anyway) states that 2 objects can be distinct even if they share all the same parts and occupy the same space. For example, Lump and Angel share all the same parts and occupy the same space, yet they are two distinct objects. Furthermore, 2 objects can also be distinct even if they share the same historical properties, as long as they differ in other (e.g. modal) properties: Lumpl and Goliath are different objects even if they were both created and destroyed at the same time. For the sake of simplicity, I'll concern myself with the latter case (where all physical and historical properties are shared by the two objects), but this can probably be extended to the former case as well.
Grounding Problems:
The grounding worry is as follows:
(1) Physical properties fully ground all modal properties
(2) If (1), then objects that share all the same physical properties share the same modal properties.
(3) So, objects that share all the same physical properties share the same modal properties ((1), (2))
(4) If (3), then if Lumpl and Goliath share all the same physical properties, then Lumpl and Goliath share all the same modal properties.
(5) So, if Lumpl and Goliath share all the same physical properties, then Lumpl and Goliath share all the same modal properties ((3), (4))
(6) Lumpl and Goliath share all the same physical properties.
(7) So, Lumpl and Goliath share all the same modal properties ((5), (6))
(8) If Lumpl and Goliath share all the same modal properties, then the 2-ist explanation fails.
(9) So, the 2-ist explanation fails ((7), (8))
Quick defense of the premises:
(1) seems like a natural way of thinking of modal properties: the way an object is (physically) will determine the kinds of things the object can be/do.
(2) just expresses the thought that if a fully grounds b, then objects that are identical in terms of a will be identical in terms of b.
(4) is just an example of (2) in action.
(6) is just true by hypothesis. The reason I use Lumpl and Goliath instead of Lump and Angel is to prevent accusations that causal-historical properties count as part of the physical properties of an object: in this case, the causal-historical properties of the two objects are identical as well as all the other physical properties.
(8) is justified as follows: the 2-ist argues that Lumpl and Goliath are different objects because they have different modal properties. (8) just claims that if Lumpl and Goliath don't have different modal properties, then they are not different objects.
Justin's Move:
It seems like the most plausible premise to deny is (1), which is exactly what Justin did. Justin had an argument for his denial of (1), which goes as follows.
Define Fragility1 as: x is fragile iff it can be shattered by being hit.
Define Fragility2 as: x is fragile iff it can be destroyed by being hit.
(10) if physical properties fully ground all modal properties, then physical properties fully ground both Fragility1 and Fragility2.
(11) if physical properties fully ground Fragility2, then in a debate about whether objects can be destroyed by shattering the physical properties could act as evidence for one view over the other.
(12) It is not the case that in a debate about whether objects can be destroyed by shattering the physical properties could act as evidence for one view over the other.
(13) So, it is not the case that physical properties fully ground Fragility2. ((11), (12))
(14) So, it is not the case that physical properties fully ground modal properties ((10), (13))
I won't bother defending the premises, since that is not actually my concern (someone else is free to challenge them). Suppose we take the conclusion of the argument, and accept that (1) has been plausibly denied. We still have the grounding question: if physical properties don't fully ground modal properties, what does? We could just say that modal properties are brute, but Justin has another way out which might be a little better.
Justin proposed that what grounds the modal properties of something might be the type of thing it is. In other words, Lumpl is the type of thing lump, which includes the modal property of being able to survive squishing ('squishability'). Goliath is the type of thing statue which does not include the modal property of being able to survive squishing ('non-squishability'). Problem solved?
Another Grounding Problem:
Suppose that what grounds the modal property of non-squishability that Goliath has is the sortal property statue. What, then, grounds the sort statue? We can't say that it is physical properties, since Lumpl shares all its physical properties with Goliath. So if physical properties grounded the sort statue, then Lumpl would be a statue, and thus have all the same modal properties that Goliath has (which would in turn entail that the 2-ist is wrong by premise (8)). Maybe the way here would be to say that sortal properties like statue are brute. This is not to concede defeat to the original argument: maybe these sortal properties are less mysterious than modal properties. Whatever view we take, we had better not accept:
(15) Physical properties fully ground all sortal properties.
Even though the 2-ist is forced to reject (15), it seems strange to say that sortal properties such as statue are not grounded at all in physical properties. So the end result might look like:
(17) (Physical properties and x) fully ground sortal properties.
Where x is something interesting Justin says in response to this post.
As we approach the topic of the extent to which objects can lose and gain parts over time, it might be useful for you to read up a bit on the Ship of Theseus. The following papers are old, yet fun, short and informative. We'll (at most) barely touch on them tomorrow.They are all e-available:
How to Reidentify the Ship of Theseus
Brian Smart Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 5. (Apr., 1972), pp. 145-148.
Smart on Conditions of Identity
Lawrence H. Davis Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 3. (Jan., 1973), pp. 109-110.
How Not to Reidentify the Parthenon
Francis W. DauerAnalysis Vol. 33, No. 2. (Dec., 1972), pp. 63-64.
The Ship of Theseus, the Parthenon and Disassembled Objects
Brian Smart Analysis Vol. 34, No. 1. (Oct., 1973), pp. 24-27.
I'm sorry about the messy formatting. I tried to copy and paste from the front page of the PDFs. Mistakes were made.
Friday, September 21, 2012
Just Matter and Personhood
In our last class, Shawn brought up a possible objection to the Just Matter theory which goes more or less as follows:
- If Just Matter theory is true, then 'person' is a phase sortal.
- If 'person' is a phase sortal, then we cannot make sense of our obligations and responsibilities towards other persons.
- But we can make sense of our obligations and responsibilities towards other persons
- Therefore, Just Matter theory is false.
I am curious about what you guys think of this objection, specifically premise 2. While in class, we did not give many reasons for thinking that 2 is true, but we also did not give any reasons for thinking that 2 is false. Here's one:
5. 'child' is a phase sortal.
6. We can make sense of our responsibilities towards children.
7. if 5 and 6, then 2 is false
8. Therefore, 2 is false.
Hopefully 5 and 6 are uncontroversial, so here's a defense of 7: it seems that any explanation of our responsibilities towards people insofar as they are children will allow for the fact that having the phase sortal 'child' entails having certain responsibilities towards them. But it seems like an analogous case can be made for 'persons' as phase sortal. Just like, insofar as something is a child, there are special responsibilities we must have towards them, it seems like insofar as something is a person, we can have special responsibilities towards them. There doesn't seem to be anything about the phase sortal 'person' that differentiates it from the phase sortal 'child' unless we assume that 'person' is not a phase sortal. But this would be to beg the question against the Just Matter theory.
Of course, there might be special reasons for thinking that 'person' couldn't be a phase sortal, but I see no principled reason for denying this. Any thoughts?
Thursday, September 20, 2012
After we "finish" our discussion of the statue and the clay. We'll take up the extent to which an object can change over time and yet continue to exist. We'll apply some of the basic theoretical work to the subject of art restoration. Check the next few posts for suggested readings.
Here's one on art restoration that has been extensively discussed:
Here's one on art restoration that has been extensively discussed:
On Restoring and Reproducing Art Author(s): Mark Sagoff Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, No. 9 (Sep., 1978), pp. 453-470
Unless indicated otherwise, the papers listed on the blog are electronically available.
Another very useful paper on restoration is this:
Art and Its PreservationAuthor(s): David Carrier. Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Spring, 1985), pp. 291-300
I'd like to just send you PDFs. In a recent ruling, The Supreme Court of Canada seems to have functionally expanded what counts as the fair use of texts for educational and research purposes, but I'm going to play things safe for now. Consequently, you'll have to go to the e-library to download your own PDFs.
I'll post some suggestions for papers on the Ship of Theseus paper soon.
Remember: feel free to use this blog as a medium for conducting fuller discussions of what we talked about in class.
Sunday, September 16, 2012
Welcome to the Blog for Philosophy 4460, an Ontology of Art Seminar being offered during the fall of 2012 at The University of Manitoba. I'm Carl Matheson, the instructor for the course.In this blog I'll let you know of the papers that I've assigned you to read and of the topics for the papers you'll be expected to write. The blog will, I hope, mainly provide us with an avenue for conducting discussions between classes. Please feel free to try out ideas. arguments and critiques. And, of course, play nice.
Next week's (September 18) class will concern the relationship between a given statue and the clay from which it is molded. I have already assigned the chapter on constitution from Conee and Sider's Riddles of Existence and have distributed copies of the chapter in class. Let me know if you don't have a copy. I'd also like you to read Ryan Wasserman's wonderful entry on material constitution in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/material-constitution/ I realize that I'm assigning a fairly long paper only two days before class, but please try to find time to at least give it a quick read before Tuesday. It goes far beyond what is presented in Riddles. Because we'll be discussing an issue at the heart of metaphysics,we'll only be able to scratch the surface, but I hope that we'll come away with a decent rough map.
Next week's (September 18) class will concern the relationship between a given statue and the clay from which it is molded. I have already assigned the chapter on constitution from Conee and Sider's Riddles of Existence and have distributed copies of the chapter in class. Let me know if you don't have a copy. I'd also like you to read Ryan Wasserman's wonderful entry on material constitution in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/material-constitution/ I realize that I'm assigning a fairly long paper only two days before class, but please try to find time to at least give it a quick read before Tuesday. It goes far beyond what is presented in Riddles. Because we'll be discussing an issue at the heart of metaphysics,we'll only be able to scratch the surface, but I hope that we'll come away with a decent rough map.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)